By withdrawing from Afghanistan, Canada and the Netherlands are leaving the development of peacebuilding to others.

News of the Dutch withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan, combined with Canada’s parliamentary mandated withdrawal at the end of this year, represents an unceremonious end to NATO’s experimentation with a new, integrated form of peacebuilding. It will now be left to the U.S. and the U.K. to lead the substantial effort of figuring out how to build peace in 21st century conflicts.

There is an emerging consensus that state failure is the product of a complex relationship between different political and economic factors. If peacebuilding is to be successful, it needs to provide solutions to all of these problems.

This represents a dramatic break from the past and poses a particular challenge for Canada. Our long-held, and somewhat mythical, view of peacekeeping as blue helmets passively separating two warring parties no longer matches the reality on the ground. Pearson’s model does not apply when there is not yet peace to keep.

Canada and the Netherlands have responded to this challenge with innovation. Both have been leaders in developing a new form of peacebuilding that is both more ambitious and more demanding than previous models. Rather than treat defence, diplomacy, and development as separate but related components of our broader engagement, Canada now seeks to do all three at once. From this perspective our various military, diplomatic, and humanitarian activities should reinforce each other, together creating the stability, prosperity, and local support needed for rebuilding a failed state. This approach has been called, “3D,” “Whole-of-Government,” and “Integrated Peacebuilding.”

The NATO mission in Afghanistan is perusing strikingly varied goals – killing Taliban, building schools, dams, and roads, delivering government services, promoting democracy, and protecting women’s rights. What’s more, depending on which of these are prioritized, policies likewise shift. If we are fighting the insurgents at all costs, we care less about the number of women in schools. If we are building government capacity, we have a higher threshold for corruption. Finding this balance has been the central challenge of the mission, and Canada and the Netherlands have been leaders.

This is a different kind of involvement for Canada and places new demands on our civil service. Departments accustomed to pursuing differing goals now have to agree on a common course of action. The complexities of civil conflicts have to be grasped with sensitivity and insight.

While progress has been made, much work remains. I had hoped that Canada would lead NATO in addressing the following lingering challenges.

First, peacebuilding demands balance. According to the Manley Panel on Canada’s role in Afghanistan, “for best effect, all three components of the strategy – military, diplomatic, and development – need to reinforce each other.” Withdrawing combat forces while continuing development and diplomatic efforts creates strategic confusion just as the disparate components of our mission were starting to come together.

Second, much of the Canadian debate about our role in Afghanistan has omitted the international context. We are a modest contributor in a 35-member coalition. Success or failure in Afghanistan depends crucially on the actions of our allies more than our own. In this sense, it is hard to see the benefit of an arbitrary withdrawal in 2011. Our commitment has to be viewed in the context of the larger strategy, one in which we will no longer have a voice.

Third, coordinated and comprehensive policymaking demands exceptional clarity. The government has consistently failed to provide the verifiable information, clear benchmarks, and concrete timelines necessary to judge Canada’s mission accurately. An arbitrary withdrawal date imposed irrespective of our strategic objectives ensures that the type of transparent policy-making necessary for complex peace operations will not be developed.

Fourth, strategy begins in the capital. While Prime Minister Harper has taken steps to improve coordination between the departments contributing to the mission, old habits die hard. Other countries, such as the UK, have explored alternate means of encouraging departments to work together when managing complex peacebuilding missions. We will not get the chance to see through such necessary shifts in our own bureaucracy.

Whereas the Americans originally eschewed integrated peacebuilding for a more traditional, militarized approach, by accepting General McCrystal’s recent strategic recommendations, President Obama has matched a troop surge with a tactical shift towards far greater civilian protection. In so doing, they are modeling much of their engagement after the Canadian experience in Kandahar, and are picking up where Canada is leaving off.

Some may say this is the positive legacy of the Canadian mission. Others will surely see it as a missed opportunity to ensure that the future of peacebuilding has a Canadian face.

Introduction to Security and Reconstruction: Lessons from Afghanistan from Canadian International Council on Vimeo.

Taylor Owen will be moderating The Canadian International Council's upcoming e-conference, Security and Reconstruction: Lesons from Afghanistan, on March 11, 2010. For more information, visit www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org/blogs/thegpsproject/afghanistan.