A Country in Search of Might

Iran's foreign policy is designed to confuse. But, if analyzed correctly, Tehran's intention to become a major global power is clear.

For three decades now, Iran has been under the perpetual scrutiny of analysts, policymakers and international media. Yet, despite all the attention, the underlying logic of Iranian foreign policy remains an enigma for many. It is true that this policy may seem, at the first glance, contradictory and vague. One day Iran advocates a “dialogue between civilizations,” and on another it suggests “wiping Israel off the map.” On the one hand, the Islamic republic invokes peace and stability in the Middle East, while on the other, it fuels the fires by supporting the very militias that make them impossible to achieve. Iran does everything it can to put an end to its situation as a besieged fortress, while at the same time seriously hesitating to respond to recent Western overtures.

Faced with these contradictions and paradoxes, one question always surfaces: What does Iran want?

The inventors of such mental restriction techniques as ketman, Iranians excel in the art of camouflaging their intentions. Iranians are masters of doing the opposite of their declarations in order to get better results in things they want. What Iranians want is to make Iran a major power, not only capable of dominating the region, but also establishing itself as an international player on equal footing with other major powers. Far from being the fanatics that we have made them out to be, Iran’s leaders are cold and outstanding calculators who have never quit thinking in terms of “grand strategy,” of “raison d’état,” and the “maximization of power.”

When it is analyzed correctly, Iran’s intentions are crystal clear. Didn’t Mohamed El Baradei recently admit that not only does "Iran [want] to be part of the global community" but "[it] wants to have its role as a regional security power recognized"? Then why do we have so many problems deciphering Tehran’s intentions? First, it is because Iranians are masters in the art of cultivating ambivalence and blurring the lines. Second, it is because our post-realist and post-modern societies are at pains in coming to terms with the fact that other countries may be motivated by considerations other than social welfare, economic prosperity, and environmental protection. Finally, it is because we have grown accustomed to analyzing the various dimensions of Iran’s international policy separately. This compartmentalized vision leads us to lose sight of the overall Iranian strategic reasoning, something that can only be fully grasped if analyzed in as a whole. In other words, we tend to concentrate on the trees, and as such, miss the forest.

Let’s take, for example, Iran’s nuclear program. Westerners have difficulty understanding that the nuclear question is not an end in itself for the Islamic Republic, but rather a means to an end, at the service of Iran’s policy of regional and international power. All the while, its utility is in no way just limited to the military sphere. The acquisition of the atomic bomb is surely a means of attaining a dissuasive capacity; one that is, by the way, perfectly understandable in a hostile region inhabited by half a dozen nuclear powers already. But not uniquely. It may also be true that Mullahs are genuinely looking at the nuclear as an important source of electronuclear energy, allowing Iran to better anticipate the end of the hydrocarbon era and acquire for itself a further energy asset in its power relations with the West. The nuclear is equally a formidable propaganda lever, a Weapon of Mass Persuasion, giving the regime the opportunity to play the nationalist chord of Iranians, while at the same time exciting the anti-Western sentiments of the whole region. The nuclear is thus the regime’s joker, played on different tables … but always of use to its power strategy. Yet, despite it’s multitask utility, the nuclear is but one aspect of Iran’s overall diplomatic arsenal.

While the West is obsessed with the nuclear question, Iran’s power politics is also based on an ingenious strategy of regional influence. One of the main pillars of this strategy is made up of a relatively discrete, yet strong, Pan-Shiite policy. This underestimated facet of Iran’s regional strategy is directly supervised by the Supreme Leader himself, it draws support from various organisms like the Bonyads, and theological organizations, important means of audiovisual diplomacy as well as an active contribution from the Revolutionary guards. This policy has been a success since it has allowed Iran to reinforce its links with the Alawite regime in Syria; find a base in Afghanistan and Iraq – where it was totally absent a short while ago; to better run its roots in Lebanon – where, through Hezbollah, Iran can not only play the role of a state within a state but also put pressure on Israel and to conceive of itself as increasingly like a regional hegemon.

But why would the Mullahs content themselves with the Shia Crescent when they can have the moon? Far from being limited to the Shia world, Iran’s policy of regional influence is complemented by an ambitious pan-Islamic policy, developed by the late Ayatollah Khomeini. All Iranian officials have evoked the idea of “Islamic unity” in order to create what the present president has called “a pole of Islamic power,” able to stand up to the West. This policy of rapprochement is being materialized through Iran’s ascendance to the observer status at the Arab League. It is also manifesting itself on a daily basis through Iran’s support for Sunni movements like Ansar al-Islam in Iraq or the Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Palestine. Thanks to these non-Shia proxies, Iran is hurting the U.S. and Israel by imposing itself as an inevitable interlocutor. This opportunistic and pragmatic approach has been extremely rewarding so far. Tehran’s regional influence has been on the rise to such an extent that some observers are now talking about a Pax Iranica to describe the real power configuration in the Middle East. But this policy of lending a hand to the other branches of the Umma also extends to the Maghreb and the Balkans. As a former commander of the Pasdaran, Yahya Rahim Safavi, has so interestingly put it: “we have no geographical frontiers.”

In fact, Iran’s power politics recognizes neither a geographic boundary nor an ideological limit. This very opportunistic power strategy also possesses a global dimension. On the international front, the Mullahs lead a discrete Weltpolitik, remarkably free of religious and ideological considerations. In Asia, they are working hard to build a friendly strategic shield around Iran by working with non-Muslim partners like Russia or China. Mullahs frantically seek membership in the Shanghai Co-operation Organization in which they see a bloc of states that can provide an important counterweight to the West and act as a launching pad for Iran’s expansion of its regional ambitions. In Africa, Iran maintains increasingly close relations with such countries as Ivory Coast, Senegal, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Thanks to its masterful "oil diplomacy," Tehran has been able to secure these African states’ support for its nuclear program. As an Iranian official put it, “2008 was a turning point in Iran’s relations with Africa.” The same scenario goes in Latin America where the Mullahs have capitalized on the rise of neo-Bolivarianism in order to establish privileged relations with Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Paraguay. Slowly but surely Iran is inserting itself in the “Great Satan’s” backyard.

Iran is thus engaged in a multifaceted foreign policy, comparable in all respects to China’s Unrestricted Warfare. This is a pragmatic and ingenious approach, consisting of the development and exploitation of all options available to the Iranian regime: religion, the nuclear, Third-Worldism, hydrocarbon resources, pipeline politics, to which one must add a particularly skilful utilization of strategic communications, public diplomacy and other forms of modern propaganda. But at the end of day what must be kept in mind is that the various aspects of Iran’s foreign policy and outlook are oriented, in their entirety, toward the achievement of one goal: increasing the national, regional, and international power of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This asymmetrical strategy has paid off and one should expect Iran to continue down this path. It consists of combining daring and cautiousness, to dodge head-on collisions and to “win by not losing," to borrow Henry Kissinger’s words.

What Iran really wants is thus relatively clear despite the attempts by its leaders to mislead Westerners who obstinately refuse to face facts. The objective is to place ancient Persia, once again, at the Olympus of Great States. In return, however, the West’s wishes and intentions are wanting in clarity. What does the West want? Regional stability? Access to the country's hydrocarbon reserves? To continue containing Iran into a secondary role in the Middle East? Or to remake it into the regional gendarme? These are the many questions and options with regards to which the West must be able to determine a clear position before developing a coherent policy vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran.