Don't Shoot Messenger Fadden

Alleged acts of Chinese espionage in Canada support CSIS head Richard Fadden's vague comments on foreign influence.

Before some of Canada’s political class line up eagerly to shoot the messenger, they may be better off asking whether Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) director Richard Fadden is right in his warnings regarding foreign interference in Canada’s political affairs

Fadden's remarks raise two fundamental questions: do Chinese spies and possibly their non-Chinese operatives lurk within our political structures? If so, how much of a concern should it be to Canadians?

Relying solely on news reports, Fadden’s comments warrant investigation, not hasty retreats.

Last spring, the New York Times reported on GhostNet, an almost exclusively China-based operation that had infiltrated at least 1,295 computers in 103 countries, including many belonging to embassies, foreign ministries, and government offices. According to the researchers at the University of Toronto's Munk Centre for International Studies who discovered the online spy scheme, Canada was not immune.

Two years earlier, Bombardier refused to comment on reports that Chinese technicians were caught stealing aerospace secrets at one of its Canadian facilities. The company also declined to comment on reports that its negotiators were spied upon during a trip to China.

The are several other reports of alleged Chinese espionage in Canada. In 2006 for example, Canadian human rights activist Mehmet Tohti reported to CSIS that three Chinese men in a black SUV spied on his suburban home until 1:30 a.m. It was not his first encounter with such tactics.

One year earlier, two former Chinese security officials – now defectors – claimed the Chinese government had a network of about 1,000 spies and informants in Canada.

Lastly, in 2001, reporting on the removal of the Tibetan flag during the 1996 APEC Summit, Judge Ted Hughes wrote: “I find it alarming that the Chinese Consulate was in contact with the informant and took steps to influence the RCMP to remove the flag … the RCMP must not tolerate interference by foreign diplomats or officials into security matters, particularly where the constitutional rights of Canadian citizens are at stake.”

These are a few cases from what spymasters might call the “Google file,” because they’re all available on the net. But if they are reflective of what is publicly known, imagine how much more intelligence may be available to agencies such as CSIS.

While none of these instances directly involve bureaucrats or officials, is it such a stretch to consider that China might also pursue its ambitions at other levels?

One of the most controversial reports regarding Chinese espionage is known as Project Sidewinder, a 1997 CSIS-RCMP investigation to gather and analyze intelligence about efforts by the Chinese government and Asian criminal gangs to influence Canadian business and politics.

While the report was ordered to be destroyed, shelved, or delayed depending upon your point of view, it was also leaked.

In light of subsequent events, its findings have proven incredibly clairvoyant.

Project Sidewinder noted: "China remains one of the greatest ongoing threats to Canada's national security and Canadian industry.”

Contrast that opinion with some of the concluding remarks in the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission's 2009 annual report to Congress: "Chinese espionage activities in the United States are so extensive that they comprise the single greatest risk to the security of American technologies."

When foreign interest becomes foreign interference, it’s incumbent upon our government to protect Canada and the rights of Canadians.

Fadden's timing may not have been perfect, and his words may have been erroneously decoded to cast inappropriate aspersion on some solely because of their ethnicity – but his underlying assumptions may be dead-on.

Fadden’s job is not to court foreign favour. His job is to protect Canada and Canadians. The threat he raised must be a matter for further inquiry by Canada’s security apparatus – not a justification for a swift bureaucratic execution.