The Iranian presidential elections will not be decided in the polling stations but behind the closed doors of the Supreme Leader’s circle. Four trusted religious candidates are ratified by the unelected 12-member Guardianship Council, and then the tightly controlled electoral machine “elects” the desired candidate. Nonetheless, presidential elections in Iran create much enthusiasm and excitement. Despite enduring brutal suppression, jailing of dissidents, and closure of even semi-independent newspapers, the amazingly vibrant Iranian civil society takes advantage of the short-lived election period to advance and articulate its demands, expose the political, cultural, and economic failures of the Islamic regime, and thus further delegitimize the clerical rule.

Iranian citizens were disappointed with the previous "reformist" President, Hojat-al-Islam Mohamad Khatami (1997-2005), and are disillusioned with the possibility of reforms. As such, a growing number of political activists and organizations have chosen not to mobilize around any one candidate but to launch a campaign, identified as “demand-based discourse," to be heard by the country's politicians. At the forefront of this campaign is the Iranian women’s movement. This movement and its demands are so omnipresent that candidates have begun to respond by showing their female-friendly position by appearing with their wives in election rallies. The youth have also put forth their demands, as have other groups such as Mothers for Peace, The Bus Workers Unions, and the Publishers Associations.

The demands range from the calls for “individual, civic, and political freedoms; freedom of press, of assembly, and expression,” to “citizenship rights,” and the “revision and amendment of articles of the Constitution that undermine equalities of sexes, religions, and ethnicity.”

In a political system that is based on the “absolute sovereignty of the jurist” these demands cannot be met and none of the candidates screened by the Guardianship Council, or any president for that matter, has the authority to fulfill these lingering wishes, even if he willed them. This is well known to the groups who put forward these demands. Thus, the debate once again surrounds the Hamletian question: to vote or not to vote. As in the previous election, which was boycotted by a significant number of mostly educated people, many argue that participation legitimizes the authoritarian theocracy. Others argue that given the terrible four years of Ahmadinejad and his military/security clique, the horrific economic deterioration despite the massive rise in oil revenues, as well as the cultural degradation, worsening political suppression, and deterioration of Iran’s international status, citizens should vote for the lesser of two evils.

To be sure, the four chosen candidates are integral parts of the establishment. Mohsen Rezaee, the former Commander of the Islamic Guards who is on Interpol’s wanted list for “crimes against life and health, hooliganism/vandalism/damage,” is, like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a member of the “Principalists,” or the fundamentalist Islamist current. Mir Hossein Mussavi was the last prime minister before the elimination of the post, during whose premiership the big massacre of political prisoners took place, over six thousand of them executed without trial. He is a conservative-cum-reformer. Mehdi Karoubi, twice speaker of the Parliament, is a reformer and the only cleric candidate in this round.

It is very difficult to anticipate which of these four candidates will be favoured by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, based on whose final decision the electoral machine of the regime mobilizes its voters through the web of mosques, religious foundations, militia, and other institutions. Khamenei has so far spoken in favour of Ahmadinejad and has praised his “good decisions” (sic), but at the same time seems to be heedful of the dangers of his reelection and may in the final analysis reconsider. Mir Hossein Mussavi, who has never challenged the establishment, and in the absence of better candidates has the growing support of the educated public and many groups of the civil society, may also be considered favourably by the Supreme Leader.

In the end, while no major changes can be expected from this election, the removal of Ahmadinejad will benefit Iranians and the world over. It is on this basis that campaigners in civil society are mobilizing the voters to vote for the lesser evil. Iranian civil society is maturing and now seeks the opportunity to seriously challenge the hegemony of the mullahs and put an end to the religious state, eventually establishing a long sought-after secular democratic state in Iran.