The World's Most Dangerous Idea?

Human exceptionalism suggests that animal rights advocacy poses risks to human well-being, but denying animals their rights might prove even more dangerous.

Human beings have a superiority complex, and some of us even espouse the idea that our capabilities separate us from all other species. Defending this brand of human exceptionalism – some might call it speciesism – Canadian bioethicist Margaret Somerville denounces what she calls “the world's most dangerous idea … that there is nothing special about being human and, therefore, humans do not deserve ‘special respect’ as compared with other animals.” However, what if embracing this “dangerous idea” is actually the most compassionate and just course of action?

According to Somerville, the source of the danger comes from an argument by philosopher Peter Singer proposing that the interests of non-human animals be given equal consideration. He is the author of Animal Liberation, a book frequently associated with the animal rights movement; Singer himself, however, uses the term “rights” very broadly and supports initiatives more accurately described as welfarist.

Somerville is particularly disturbed by Singer’s more recent speculations that, should we develop sentient robots, we would be obligated to give them some consideration as well. Singer argues maintains that treatment of others should not be based on their species but on their ability to suffer, but Somerville suggests that this would inevitably lead to the notion that we should not do to animals what we do not do to animals – namely, kill and eat them. This may seem reasonable, but Somerville is alarmed by the idea that self-conscious, intelligent beings who have “free will and emotions comparable to those of humans should be treated as non-human persons.”

Rather than supporting this sensible and compassionate point of view, she sees it as dangerous to vulnerable humans. “It could also lead to situations in which [highly intelligent] robots would be seen to deserve greater respect than humans,” Somerville contends. But in order to make this leap of logic she conveniently disregards Singer’s own explicit rejection of the idea that special treatment should be based on morally irrelevant criteria such as intelligence, not to mention his caveat that we would only need to give moral consideration to robots if they were fully conscious and sentient beings.

Given the fact that such robots do not exist, Singer’s article about moral consideration for intelligent robots is, of course, speculative – a kind of thought experiment about a hypothetical future world. Animal abuse and exploitation, on the other hand, is very real and very relevant. By conflating the issues, she deflects serious ethical consideration of animal rights, lumping them in with conjecture.

Somerville’s defence of human exceptionalism seems to be based largely on the notion that, unlike animals, humans have moral consciousness, which she equates with the theological concept of “the soul.” Setting aside the recent findings that some animals do, in fact, have ethical and moral consciousness, Somerville’s approach is flawed and circular. As we know too well, some humans, such as those who are seriously cognitively impaired, do not have the capacity for moral consciousness. Her argument, therefore seems to be that humans deserve special respect simply because they are human.

What is most striking – and disappointing – about the ideology of human exceptionalism is that its proponents never argue that, because of our unique abilities, we should be more proactive in protecting the interests of other species. Instead, our privileged status only gives us the right to continue exploiting them.

Of course, all human exceptionalists (which is to say, speciesists) make ritual mention of animal welfare or humane treatment of animals, terms that are virtually meaningless in a context where animals are treated as property. To fill her quota, Somerville makes the vague suggestion that we should give “very careful consideration” to our treatment of animals, even though she has already made it clear that she regards any efforts to do so as “very dangerous.” She is alarmed when our own exalted status is questioned, but Somerville never explicitly says how compassionate efforts to stop the suffering and premature death of other animals will actually harm humans or infringe upon our rights.

Human exceptionalists suggest that rejecting our species’ special status will make it easier for people to enslave, exploit, or exterminate other humans – if we’re no better than animals, they suggest, why wouldn’t we be able to exploit each other the same way we exploit animals we classify as game and livestock?

Thus, human exceptionalism is our only bulwark against chaos, Somerville insists. Here, we find a familiar religious echo: only belief in an omnipotent being who judges our behaviour will prevent us from doing evil and selfish things. Like exceptionalism, this is a bleak view of human nature, suggesting that the only reason we don’t commit crimes is because God is watching us.

Moreover, human exceptionalists seem to think that human versus animal rights is a zero-sum game. Recognizing the value of all human life in no way requires us to deny that same consideration to other animals, and in fact, some humanitarians have suggested that we cannot truly value humanity until we extend compassion to the natural world. “Until he extends the circle of his compassion to all living things, man will not himself find peace,” writes theologian Albert Schweitzer.

Albert Einstein, the influential physicist and philosopher, offered a similar view, acknowledging in the New York Times that one of humanity’s greatest flaws is its inability to look beyond itself. “A human being is a part of the whole, called by us the ‘Universe’ … He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings, as something separate from the rest,” he writes. “This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty.”

Those who support animal rights have overcome this self-imposed confinement and have found a key to the prison door. Historically, animal rights advocates have not been opposed to human rights – on the contrary, they also have been strong supporters of rights for those denied protections due to their age, gender, sexuality, or ethnicity. Furthermore, the argument that animals capable of suffering or sentience might endanger humans holds no ground, since other humans share these characteristics and will be afforded protections. Perhaps the solution is to fortify human rights, rather than deny the same rights to animals.

But the “dangers” posed by compassion towards animals is just a cover. The real danger lies in the fact that animal advocacy threatens humans’ freedom to dominate and exploit other living beings and to make profit from their suffering. Protecting the bottom line is the one thing human exceptionalists want to preserve at all costs.