Despite Ahmadinejad’s formal endorsement and swearing in, the confrontations between the fledgling and spontaneous Iranian civil society and the mighty repressive Islamic state will continue. The regime’s swift and outright violent response to the non-violent protests by the voters was to prevent the movement’s expansion and the escalation of political demands. It also hoped to impose violent reactions on the frustrated youth of Iran, shifting the mass peaceful civil movement into segregated small violent confrontations in which it has obvious supremacy. But it did not succeed. Now the main debates within the civil society in Iran and among the Iranian diaspora are focused on the appropriate tactics for maintaining the momentum and expanding the movement.

Iranians rightly believe that they are witnessing a most fateful turning point in the history of their nation. If the correct strategy is followed, the Islamic state will be irreparably weakened, paving the way for further advances towards the establishment of a secular democratic state. The wrong strategy, however, could give the Islamic state a chance to find a way to overcome the most severe crisis in its 30 years of existence and re-establish its hegemony.

The civil society activists include women’s groups, youth and students, intellectuals and some workers’ groups, representing a wide spectrum of ideologies, tactics, and demands. Some are seeking few minor changes, others seek serious reforms within the existing system, and some groups want an immediate end to the regime through a revolution. The dominant view, so far, has been that of the reformists; the majority of the opposition forces know their own strengths and weaknesses, and have no illusions about the regime or its enormous suppressive capabilities.

At the same time, the two factions of the regime are in a most precarious position. Neither side can back down, yet both factions know that if they do not come up with a compromise the whole system could be in jeopardy. The more the crisis persists, the more internal divisions rise to the surface.

The new dynamic of Iranian politics is that the Islamic regime does not have the capacity to reform itself from within unless it is forced to do so, and the civil society does not want another violent revolution unless it is forced to move in that direction.

In this unbalanced confrontation, the main question is who will blink first. As long as the opposition does not elevate the level of confrontation, the regime will not increase the existing level of suppression and killing, and the stalemate continues. The fact that the leadership of the opposition is under the control of a faction of the regime is both its weakness and its strength. As the past few weeks indicate, the Mousavi/Karoubi/Khatami/Rafsanjani camp has lowered the level of confrontations with the hope of reaching some sort of resolution. Despite this weakness, their presence among the opposition gives a degree of protection to the activists; without them, many more people would have been killed, disappeared, and jailed.

The initiative for any possible compromise and an end to the stalemate needs to come from the state. For now, assuming that opposition leaders would not escalate the confrontation and the resistance would subside, the establishment has decided on the policy of business-as-usual with Ahmadinejad as President. However, this may not be that easy, both nationally and internationally, as the civil society will not back down and opposition leaders have no choice but to support some degree of confrontation. The show trials of Tehran aim to scare the opposition and there are even calls for the prosecution of Moussavi. Internationally, only 11 countries have recognized Ahmadinejad’s government and new UNSC sanctions would create more serious problems for the regime. Ironically Israel, with the implicit or explicit support of the U.S., can inadvertently come to the rescue of Ahmadinejad/Khamenei by increasing and even using their threat of military attack.

If the business-as-usual policy does not work, different scenarios could be at play. Thanks to his own political blunder of openly getting involved in the electoral coup, the status of the Supreme Leader Khamenei is severely weakened. The chants of death to the dictator, death to Khamenei, and his son Mojtaba who leads the crackdown, were unfathomable before. There were some rumours of the possibility of his removal by the all-mullah Assembly of Experts, although this is very unlikely for now. Some also count on his well advanced leukemia expediting his removal.

Ahmadinejad has continued his rude and divisive approach. He ignored Khamenei’s demand to remove his newly-appointed deputy, Esfandiar Mashaie, and then under pressure removed him but appointed him as his Advisor and Chief of Staff. He has angered the majority of the members of both the Parliament and the Assembly of Experts, and hysterically fired two of his cabinet members.

The scenario of dumping Ahmadinejad to save the Leader and the system is a serious option as well, but this will depend on the strength of the opposition movement and how firmly the “Green” candidates stand their ground. A scenario, first raised by the liberal opposition group The National Front, is that the ultra-right clerical-military alliance would arrange the assassination of Ahmadinejad and use this as a pretext for a military takeover and the end of the republican Islamic state. The Revolutionary Guard would then rule by sheer force and resort to total suppression. To gain recognition by Western governments, the scenario assumes that the new regime would give major concessions in relation to the nuclear question and western trade in Iranian oil and other commodities. This scenario might not be pure fantasy. If the system reaches a collapsing point, the establishment may resort to such resolve.

Which scenario will materialize depends on the moves made by both side of the equation in this unstable equilibrium. The strategies adopted within the civil society are extremely delicate and instrumental. If it cannot maintain the morale and cautiously advance forward, the moment may be lost, and if it immaturely radicalizes, it may be crushed by the brutal and merciless forces. What is significant is that the Islamic Republic will never be the same again. Whether it compromises or resorts to totalitarian violence, it will be a weakened and discredited regime, less and less capable of preventing the civil society’s advance towards a secular democratic state.