Getting Back in the Game

Paul Heinbecker's latest book offers a well-balanced analysis of Canadian foreign policy, and should be taken seriously for its contribution to the conversation.

Every few years, readers in Canada are treated to an extended essay that assesses the state of Canadian foreign policy. Over the last decade alone, authors of such analyses have included Andrew Cohen, Jennifer Welsh, Roy Rempel, Michael Hart, and Michael Byers. Most of the time, these well-written books generate popular division. Rempel, for example, would tie Canada more closely to the U.S., regardless of the political damage that such a connection might do to national unity. Byers would distance Ottawa from Washington as aggressively as possible, without any real regard for the impact his words might have on the existing strategic, bilateral relationship. What is refreshing about Paul Heinbecker’s new book, Getting Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada is that, at least in terms of its policy recommendations, it is significantly less polarizing.

Certainly, Getting Back in the Game includes an element of “us vs. them.” The “us” refers to optimists, while the “them” refers to pessimists, defeatists, and perhaps realists. Optimists look at Canada’s 34 million people and see a country that is more populous than 160 others. Pessimists note that the Canadian population is one thirty-fifth of the size of China’s.

Heinbecker’s optimistic view of Canada’s place in the world forms the core argument of his book:

I believe that Canadians want their country to exercise its own judgment, to do good and well, both. That is my aspiration for Canada too. I intend this book to be an antidote to the pinched vision and curtailed ambition I see in contemporary foreign policy, and to the unique Canadian blend of self-deprecation and self-satisfaction evident in so much public commentary about it. What remains for us to do is surmount our insecurities, summon our vision, and exercise our will to get back into the game – and go for gold.

Having worked as a speechwriter, a foreign policy advisor, and a Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, Heinbecker has an extensive background in the proverbial trenches of Canadian foreign policy. His knowledge and experience in the field form the basis for this book’s greatest strength: a series of largely balanced, rational analyses of contemporary security issues that are relevant to Canada and Canadians.

Heinbecker articulately defends the importance of the United Nations and global governance to Canada’s national interests. His exploration of the Canada-U.S. relationship will not convince his critics, but it should cause them to admit that it is possible to argue for distance from Washington without presenting oneself as an irrational ideologue. Furthermore, Heinbecker’s call for greater prime ministerial leadership is perfectly in line with an optimistic view of Canada’s worldly potential. In other words, Heinbecker’s impressive rhetorical skills, which he developed during his career in the Department of External Affairs and later in the Department of Foreign Affairs, served him well in the writing of this book. Critics cannot simply write this book off, even if they do not accept its premise.

What’s more, one does not have to be an optimist to agree with many of Heinbecker’s observations and policy prescriptions: Canada does have the ability (in certain instances) to make a difference in world affairs; the capacity of Canada’s foreign service has been sadly eroding; both principles and pragmatism are necessary to the development of a sustainable strategic international policy; the foreign-policy process has become far too partisan in recent years; Canadians cannot afford to ignore their southern neighbour; states the size of Canada must keep their word on the world stage if they hope to have any credibility; and multilateral organizations and institutions do tend to serve the interests of the non-great powers.

This is not to say that the book is without fault. Proponents of a networked approach to contemporary diplomacy will undoubtedly criticize Heinbecker’s rather traditional, Foreign Affairs-centric understanding of world issues. Those who call for further North American integration will rightly note that doing more in the world during the Axworthy years did not get Canada any more respect from Washington, something that Getting Back in the Game suggests it always does. Historians will be unimpressed with the romantic summary of Canadian foreign policy in the 1940s and 1950s, and so-called pessimists will point to Canada’s defeat in its campaign for a Security Council seat, using that as evidence that Heinbecker has profoundly exaggerated Ottawa’s capacity for global influence.

But regardless of whether one agrees with the specific arguments Heinbecker presents, sensible readers will emerge from this book with respect for the author. Heinbecker has made the optimists’ case with reason and care. Getting Back in the Game should be read – and taken seriously – by analysts of Canadian foreign policy at home and abroad.

This review was originally written at the request of the Canadian International Council (CIC).