Egypt After Mubarak: Talking About a Revolution?

Mubarak’s departure from power is hardly inconsequential, but is it more symbolic than substantial?

President Hosni Mubarak’s departure from Cairo on Feb. 11 unleashed a torrent of breathless media commentary about the “Egyptian Revolution.” It may be that change of a revolutionary magnitude is in store for Egypt, but to date the events in that country resemble something more akin to a popular uprising followed by a palace coup. The ruling regime and state apparatus remain largely intact.

The absence of a clearly defined leadership cadre on the part of the rebels makes it rather difficult to assess what has been achieved. It is, however, possible to evaluate the current state of play against an inventory of demands issued by the “Jan. 25” movement, and translated in a recent ZNet article authored by Juan Cole. Following is a summary checklist, based upon key demands and my understanding of the regime’s responses:

The setting aside of the present constitution and its amendments: Done. The current constitution was suspended on Feb. 13.

The formation of a working group to draft a new and democratic constitution that resembles the older of the democratic constitutions, on which the Egyptian people would vote in a referendum: Done. A new constitution is to be promulgated in 10 days and made subject to a national referendum within two months.

Dissolution of the federal parliament: Done, but control of the day-to-day operations of the Egyptian government remains in the hands of a cabinet headed by Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq – a former chief of the air force and a Mubarak supporter who has promised to appoint new ministers.

Creation of a transitional, collective governing council: Done, but likely not as was hoped for. The ultimate decision-making power rests with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, a body chaired by Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi.

Immediate repeal of the state of emergency, which suspends constitutional protections for human rights: Not done, although reference to lifting the order has been made.

The immediate release of all political prisoners: Not done, and little is known of the fate of those arrested during the uprising.

The formation of an interim government comprising independent nationalist trends, which would oversee free and fair elections: Not done, but elections have been promised within six months.

Removal of any restriction on the free formation of political parties, on civil, democratic, and peaceful bases: Not done.

Freedom of the press: Not formally done, although active censorship has decreased since the start of the uprising. The state-owned daily Al-Ahram switched allegiances during the protests to become a “voice of the people.” TV Egypt and other media have since followed suit.

Freedom to form unions and non-governmental organizations without government permission: Not done. However, in defiance of a military ban, many existing unions are now striking for improved pay and benefits.

Abolition of all military courts and abrogation of their rulings with regard to civilian accused: Not done.

In short, even though Mubarak has stepped aside, Egypt remains in a state of emergency. The country is under the rule of a clique comprised of the former president's fellow travellers and appointees. Many of the members of this deeply entrenched elite have strong ties to the West, and the group possesses an overriding economic and political interest in maintaining the status quo. They have vowed to restore “normalcy” to Egypt. But that is not the aim of the resistance, and people are beginning to express fears that the military is “hijacking the revolution.”