Michael Ignatieff's Greatest Mistakes

The Liberal leader's fear of coalitions hobbled his chances of victory.

I have sometimes been a critic of Liberal Leader Michael Ignatieff, yet I take no pleasure in his recent, and very personal, defeat. Whatever my concerns with his tenure as Liberal leader, Ignatieff remains an intellectual force to be respected. A gifted writer and serious scholar, he has many contributions to his credit, and, one hopes, many more to come. I am looking forward to reading his reflections in the years ahead. However, because I also believe in challenging incorrect assumptions and learning from the mistakes of the past, I hope there is value in reflecting on what I see as two strategic errors that Ignatieff made – one early in 2009, and the other during the 2011 campaign.

As some readers may know, I have spent the better part of the last two years studying the 2008 prorogation. There is a reasonable fear that, with Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s majority win, the 2008 prorogation – and the numerous other violations against Parliament – will now be seen as acceptable in Canadian politics. This represents a serious challenge for constitutional scholars and those who tried to stand up for Canada’s principal democratic institution. It seems clear that many Canadians today prefer low taxes to political accountability.

The failure to see the Conservative party’s actions against Parliament as more than mere political manoeuvring may have been brought about by Ignatieff’s failure to challenge the 2008 prorogation once he was installed as Liberal leader. As you may recall, in early 2009, Ignatieff ruled out a coalition and supported the Conservatives’ budget. He pursued a strategy that allowed him to bide his time, introduce himself to Canadians, and wait for the right circumstances in which he could defeat the existing government. In retrospect, by waiting for future – and inevitable – examples of parliamentary disregard, the Liberals conceded the idea that the confidence of the House matters. Based on their unrealistic hope that their decline could be magically reversed, many Liberals were too proud to accept what I, and many others, have argued – that for progressives in Canada, the choice is between coalitions and Conservatives.

Of course, defeating Harper and reviving the Dion coalition early in 2009 would not have assured a Liberal victory in 2011. However, it would have allowed Ignatieff to engage Canadians on the merits of coalitions, and on our democratic right (allotted even to the “evil Separatists”) to govern ourselves through co-operative political arrangements. It could also have challenged and reversed the constitutional subversion that occurred in 2008 when prorogation was used to avoid a confidence vote in the House. This event will now likely fade from the public’s consciousness, and the broader lessons of this event will go unlearned.

Had a coalition been formed in 2009, with the support of the majority of MPs and representing a majority of Canadians, Ignatieff could have demonstrated that a co-operative approach to Canadian governance could work. Again, while Harper might have still won in 2011, at least the Liberal campaign could have been based on the difference in governing styles between a Conservative minority and a Liberal-led coalition. Nothing succeeds like the appearance of success: Because Ignatieff allowed Harper to continue as prime minister, it became too easy for some to choose the devil they knew over a political outcome with which they had no direct experience.