Questioning the Wisdom of Foreign Intervention

Could we have achieved our goals in Libya with diplomacy rather than force?

It is perhaps premature to propose much in the way of conclusions and lessons learned in the immediate wake of the rebel victory over the Gadhafi regime. On the surface, it appears that NATO countries that supported the rebellion assisted materially in achieving the objective of ridding Libya of a widely detested dictator. In terms of success, this would seem to represent more than can be said for western efforts in backing one side in the Afghan civil war, or intervening under manifestly false pretences in Iraq. Both of those episodes have proven extremely costly. Still, before breaking out any more champagne in reaction to the developments in Libya, there are several issues regarding the affair that require sober and sustained reflection – much more so than what they seem to have received at the international meeting on Libya's future, which was held in Paris on Sept. 1.

The rule of law. UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which was passed in March 2011 in response to widely reported concerns over the possibility of a massacre in Benghazi, provided NATO with the limited authority to establish a no-fly zone, and to intervene in order to protect civilians. Participating NATO members, led by the U.K. and France, quickly exceeded the resolution’s provisions by arming rebel groups, inserting special forces and advisers, and mounting a protracted, and at times intense, air campaign in service of regime change. This level of engagement goes well beyond anything provided for in the resolution, and, however much one might admire the goals, essentially amounts to vigilante action.

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What is to be made of this kind of example? It certainly lies outside the more limited precepts of humanitarian intervention, and, as such, does not qualify under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. (Indeed, it is hard to avoid the thought that oil and opportunity played a defining role in determining the nature of the course taken.) These actions suggest the continued functioning of a world order in which the “rule makers” are free to act as they please, while the “rule takers” have no such option. Anyone with an interest in just global governance cannot be thrilled about this sort of demonstration, which has all of the hallmarks of imperial overreach.

Talking versus fighting. In my book, Guerrilla Diplomacy , I spend about 300 pages making the case that if development has become the new security in the age of globalization, then diplomacy must replace defence at the centre of international policy. In that regard, the question must be posed: Why did western powers once again reach first for the gun? Why did they not consult with their own citizens before acting? Where was the diplomatic offensive?

Yes, the foreign holdings of the Gadhafi family were frozen, an arms embargo was applied, and the International Criminal Court was asked to investigate legal proceedings. But this does not constitute anything like the full-court diplomatic process that was purported to be underway. There were no comprehensive economic or political sanctions, no dispatching of special envoys, and no demands that the UN Security Council move to separate the combatants before the onset of full-blown hostilities. Hugo Chavez and, later, the government of South Africa (under African Union auspices) called for negotiations, offering mediation and good offices. Their entreaties were ignored.

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While the full extent of the civilian and combatant casualties remains unknown, their numbers have certainly been greater than might have been expected had alternatives to the use of force been fully explored. It is by no means inconceivable that a similar outcome could have been achieved without recourse to protracted violence. Another opportunity for the vigorous exercise of diplomacy has been forsaken, and that seems, to me, most unfortunate.