Memories of the Suez crisis, which resulted in Lester Pearson inventing modern peacekeeping and being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, are quickly receding. For Canadians, however, that period is worthy of sustained reflection, particularly in the wake of President Obama's recent Nobel win. Whether or not you think the president deserved the prize, the decision can certainly be interpreted as a high-level political recognition of the renewed importance of diplomacy as an approach to managing international relations through dialogue, negotiation, and compromise. In Oslo, talking trumps fighting.

Suez represented one of the final expressions of the European colonial impulse, and perhaps the last gasp of great power pretense for the United Kingdom and France. It demonstrated the fundamental shift in power across the Atlantic to the United States, shaped the future of the Middle East, and impacted the machinations, and eventual outcome, of the Cold War.This was a turning point in the world's recent political history, roughly similar in symbolic, strategic, and geopolitical consequence to the current resurgence of the Asia-Pacific generally, and China and India in particular.

Canada is again reducing the resources accorded its diplomatic institutions in general, and DFAIT in particular. It is worth recalling that following the drastic cuts associated with Program Review in the mid-nineties, Canada fundamentally down-sized its international ambitions, moving away from long-term, global order projects such as poverty eradication and world peace, and embracing instead more specialized diplomatic niches.

Even with that, this country produced the Treaty to Ban Land Mines; the International Criminal Court; and major initiatives on child soldiers, children in conflict, small arms, and "blood diamonds," the latter of which led to the Kimberly Process. In 1999 Canada also launched the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which resulted, at the UN Millenneum summit in 2005, in the widespread adoption of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.

Taken together, these achievements were skillfully, and, for the most part, retrospectively packaged by DFAIT officials as the Human Security Agenda. Canada's international reputation has in large part been riding on the inertia generated by that burst of international policy activism ever since.

But back to Suez. As the crisis deepened, and in the face of Anglo-French bellicosity, it was the United States who was seeking a peaceful resolution to the dispute through diplomacy and the use of multilateral channels. At that time, Israel, too, deferred to the UN. When contrasted against the events of the past decade, and especially the disastrous foreign policy objectives pursued by the Bush administration, Israel's invasion of Lebanon and its incursion into Gaza, these examples illustrate a near complete reversal of roles in the intervening years. Canada's intercession in the crisis resulted in what became a widely accepted association between this country and peacekeeping. That impression, much like Canadian generosity with aid and willingness to engage in conflict resolution, persists both at home and abroad, even though Canada long ago ceased to be a significant participant in multilateral activities of that kind.

Indeed, in the three years since the wholesale switch from the ISAF stabilization mission in Kabul to the aggressive pursuit of war-fighting and counter-insurgency in Kandahar, Canada's once-cherished peacekeeping ethic and tradition appears finally to have been despatched - with extreme prejudice.

Fifty years ago, there was a widely-shared conviction that this country could play a useful part in addressing major international issues, and could make a difference in determining the course of events. That now seems a strikingly distant reality. Slowly but surely, the new realities will be reflected in both popular and international perceptions.

That said, the emergence of a hetero-polar world order may present a strategic opening for Canada. Unlike the previous multi-, bi-, and unipolar dispensations, the vectors of international power and influence now vary greatly between poles, and hence have become difficult to measure or compare.

For example, the U.S. will, for the foreseeable future, be the world's leading military power. Yet its economic and industrial hegemony is fading quickly, a trend accelerated by the continuing financial crisis. Within a decade or two, the mantle of economic leadership will have passed to the Asia-Pacific region generally, and to China in particular – with India not far behind.