Playing with Fire in the Middle East

The increasing turmoil in Iran and Syria raises the prospect of regional war.

The Middle East has been aptly referred to as a powder keg on many occasions in the past, but never before has said powder keg been so close to blowing up.

The Arab Spring brought down several seemingly stable dictatorial rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and more are almost certain to follow. Popular unrest is on the rise, civil wars are looming in Yemen and Syria, and Islamist fundamentalists are jockeying for state power. Worst of all, preparations for yet another war in the region appear to be underway.

Of all these different theatres of conflict, none rivals the case of Iran and, by extension, its main ally, Syria. Having so far failed in forcing Iran to stop its nuclear-enrichment programs, the U.S., Israel, and their allies can no longer hide their intentions, and have raised their threat level of bombing Iran. Severe sanctions are increasingly hurting the Islamic regime, pushing it further and further into a corner, and mysterious incidents and sabotage in various Iranian military installations continue to take place.

The fact that failed U.S. policies in neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan have enormously strengthened Iran is increasingly worrisome to the West and its Arab allies. Hopes of softening the positions of the Islamic regime, and of a more moderate faction coming to power, are also dashed. Encouraged – or, indeed, pressured – by their Arab allies, the U.S. and other western governments are aiming to reduce or eliminate the threats posed by the Islamic regime. Taking advantage of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s continuous hate remarks, the present hawkish Israeli government has declared Iran an “existential threat,” and is pushing for military intervention. As a result, the Islamic regime feels increasingly isolated, and violent moves like the orchestrated invasion of the British Embassy in Tehran only reflect its desperation.

The Iranian regime is also under extreme duress internally. Infighting in the ruling bloc has reached unprecedented heights. The majority of the Iranian public, disgusted with rampant corruption, the incompetence of the clerical oligarchy, outright human-rights violations, and the country’s social, economic, and political degradations, are waiting for an opportunity to revolt again. A faction of the regime would welcome a foreign military invasion with the hope of diverting attention from internal crises and reinstating the regime’s legitimacy.

Adding to the regime’s desolation is the fact that Syria, its most important ally, is facing a very real existential threat from both inside and outside the country. When the winds of change reached the Syrian people and they revolted against President Bashar al-Assad, Assad’s Arab League “brothers” did not come to his rescue the way they did when Bahraini dictator Sheikh Hamad Al-Khalifa cried wolf about the Iranian threat. When they could not convince Assad to discard his alliance with Iran, they expelled him from the league, imposing severe sanctions on Syria in co-ordination with the U.S. and western allies. As the revolts spread and defections in the military expand, the chances of civil war in this multi-ethnic and multi-religious country increase.

In Libya, the West was easily able to arrange for a no-fly zone and mobilize more and more people to join the anti-Gadhafi campaign. It cannot do the same in Syria – at least not with the same ease. For one thing, part of Syria is under Israeli occupation, so if the West and its Arab allies were to attack Syria, Arab peoples would see it as proof that they were taking Israel’s side. Second, the Syrian military and defence capabilities are far greater than those of Libya. The Assad clan still has a lot of support, not only among Alawis and the military, but also among different minorities and secular forces that are afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood and the increased Saudi influence. Most importantly, the Syrian regime still has friends in the region that it can count on.

If Assad gives up his regime’s connections with Iran, the Arab League may rally to help him find a way out of the crisis. Alternatively, if the insurgency expands and the Assad regime gives in to internal and regional pressures and agrees to an exit strategy, the crisis could be averted. However, these scenarios seem less likely by the day.