When Jack Layton called for negotiations with the Taliban, he should have considered the teachings of the former prime minister.

The recent announcement by the Afghan government that it will seek to negotiate with the Taliban has been welcomed by many Canadians, particularly those who have long supported an end to Canada’s military involvement there. Many have suggested that the new strategy has vindicated NDP leader Jack Layton, who proposed that NATO take such action four years ago.

Lester Pearson would not have seen it that way.

For Pearson, small powers seeking to make a difference on the world stage had to remain conscious of their limitations. To be effective meant a) speaking with a common voice, b) backing up advocacy with the necessary resources, be they fiscal, human, or otherwise, and, c) acting within a coalition of like-minded members.

Pearson’s thinking remains relevant today.

Particularly in this period of minority governments, a single voice on foreign policy provides Canada’s allies with assurance that Ottawa’s word will be meaningful beyond the next session of parliament. Being willing to sacrifice demonstrates that Canadians understand the cost of international engagement. And acting multilaterally allows Canadian diplomats to build necessary support at the negotiating table where decision-making authority typically rests with the more powerful states.

When Jack Layton first called for negotiations with the Taliban in 2006, his efforts fulfilled none of these criteria.

First, by advancing an alternative strategy so publicly, he managed to politicize the issue at home (critics soon labelled him “Taliban Jack”) without having any policy impact abroad. While Layton had every reason to complain that the NDP’s view of the mission was not being given a fair hearing by the government, by stressing how an NDP government would do things differently, he undermined not just the prime minister’s credibility, but also that of Canadian foreign affairs officials on the world stage.

Pearson once said, “We might well be advised to leave more of diplomacy to the diplomats.” He was right.

Second, Layton’s call for negotiations was accompanied by the demand that Canada withdraw from the Afghanistan mission earlier than it had promised its allies. Such an action could hardly have been less Pearsonian. As Pearson once explained, “As a Canadian, I am ashamed if we accept commitments and then refuse to discharge them. In acting thus, we deceive ourselves, we let our armed forces down, and betray our allies. As I understand international affairs, and I think it is the understanding of all Canadians, when you make, and continue to accept commitments, you carry them out.”

Finally, by pledging to abandon NATO, Layton risked weakening the organization at a time when Americans were beginning to doubt its value. Again, Pearson would have been disappointed. He never failed to recognize both the importance of the U.S. to world affairs and the value of NATO as a constraint on America’s inclination to go it alone. In Pearson’s words, “Without [America’s] active participation and support, nothing can be done; at least on the broad front which is essential. Without her leadership we will be driven back to national or continental solutions for the organization of security and for progress.”

As Canada prepares to leave Afghanistan and to invest more intensely in Haiti, it is critical to recall which elements of the country’s foreign policy have made it effective on the world stage in the past.

As a small power, Canada cannot afford to allow domestic disputes to interfere with its ability to present a unified, consistent national position to its allies. It must engage selectively, setting aside the necessary resources to pursue its commitments fully and to the end. And it must remain aware of the value of coalitions, alliances, and other forms of multilateralism in keeping its partners engaged and aligned with Canadian interests.