Canada in Haiti: A Report Card

Canadian interventions have yielded some dividends, but real success has remained elusive.

During his recent visit to Haiti, Prime Minister Harper publicly committed $12 million towards putting a “temporary roof” over the beleaguered country’s federal government. The funding will provide a headquarters over the next year for key ministers and public servants.

The Preval administration undoubtedly welcomes Canada’s support, modest as it may be. If nothing else, it may help end the patronizing foreign media references to his government’s daily meetings taking place in the shade of a mango tree.

Harper sold this funding as part of Canada's wider commitment to restoring Haiti's capacity to govern. During the announcement, the prime minister again emphasized the importance of staying the course and spending what it takes to build back better.

This pledge is a reminder of Canada’s legacy of support to Haiti. Through various departments, the country has budgeted more than $1 billion in aid for the Caribbean nation since the ouster of former President Aristide in 2004. When adjusted for inflation, at least as much has been spent since diplomatic relations were initiated between the two countries in 1954.

Notwithstanding the novelty of Harper’s commitment to long-term support and good governance, it may be worth recalling that former prime minister Paul Martin made precisely the same recommendations only a few short years ago. As a matter of fact, so did another former prime minister, Jean Chrétien.

There is an old saying that goes, “History may not repeat itself, but it sure rhymes sometimes.” With all this talk of governance and reconstruction, it may well be worth revisiting Canada’s record in Haiti.

Globally, Canada’s approach to governance promotion remained more or less consistent since the Human Rights, Democratization, and Good Governance policy of the mid-1990s. In Haiti, however, CIDA's approach to governance programming has been prone to more unsteady oscillations. A few patterns have emerged though.

First, notwithstanding repeated changes in strategic priorities over where and how to promote governance, the vast majority of Canada’s development assistance was and continues to be channeled through multilateral and nongovernmental agencies. These include the Organisation for American States (OAS), UN agencies including UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP, and a wide assortment of Canadian aid groups.

Second, Canada had found it difficult to define what exactly governance means in practice much less how it ought to be measured. The country has constantly adapted its approach to good governance promotion – from “democracy and elections” in the 1990s to “public sector reform” and “change agents” today. Approaches to governance were motivated as much by on the ground conditions in Port-au-Prince, as they were by changing interests, prescriptions, and policy zeitgeist in Ottawa, Washington, and Paris.

Third, despite registering meager gains on the governance front, Canada has demonstrated persistence and commitment to Haiti when compared to other multilateral and bilateral donors. This has been partly due to the enduring historical relationship between the two countries, but also domestic pressures generated by an activist diaspora in Montreal.

Given the challenges faced by most donors in Haiti, it is difficult – and perhaps downright disingenuous – to evaluate the real outcomes of Canada’s governance agenda in Haiti.

On the one hand, if good governance implies a functioning democratic political system and a Weberian-style bureaucratic order, then Canada’s interventions in Haiti have yielded few tangible returns. Despite decades of investment and some gradual improvements under President Preval since 2006, the country’s problems have grown more intractable, not less.

But if good governance is defined more narrowly as a set of discrete interventions to strengthen public sector accountability and responsiveness, to create functioning electoral registration systems, to support the rule of law, to develop an accountable security sector and a reformed police service, and to promote human rights capacities among local NGOs, then Canada’s interventions, while still not particularly successful, have yielded some dividends.

However, even these limited gains must be put in perspective. Notwithstanding important elections in the 1990s and 2006 and a scattering of short-term successes on the security front, the overall welfare situation in Haiti has actually stumbled backwards. With the exception of an important jump in economic growth in 2009 and renewed investor confidence from the U.S., indicators of human development have trended downwards since the 1990s.

Ultimately, donors such as Canada must “know when to fold ’em.” But Canada should also learn how to adhere to a genuinely long-term agenda based on a solid partnership. It will take daring and vision, but Canada should commit to a governance agenda that challenges the conventional short-term thinking of aid cycles and political horizons. The recent multi-year commitments toward civic mediation and police reform being proposed by Canada’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force are a good sign.

Harper’s announcement that Canada will be investing in Haiti for the next decade is commendable. The needs are great. The Inter-American Development Bank announced that the earthquake caused up to $14 billion (U.S.) in damages. While politically risky at home, Harper should back his recent pledges in Port-au-Prince with serious funds and a realistic vision that puts the Haitian state at the centre of the picture. With an eye on the past, he would also do well do adopt a measure of humility with regards to what can be realistically achieved.