Canada in Afghanistan

In Kabul, Washington, Brussels, London, Paris, and Amsterdam, the debate over NATO’s role in Afghanistan is building. President Obama is not only considering the possibility of General McChrystal’s recommended troop surge and tactical shift towards far greater civilian protection, but more importantly, he is reconsidering the broader strategic objectives of the mission. Is the goal to protect America from a resurgent al-Qaeda, to build an Afghan state that can hold the Taliban at bay, or to reconfigure both Afghanistan and Pakistan? The answer will drive his decision in the coming weeks. As the president deliberates, the U.S. media and public are increasingly engaged.

In Canada, while there is a similar conversation occurring behind the closed doors of government – our mandarins must decide what we will do after the 2011 deadline set by parliament in March 2008 – there has been an astonishing silence in the public domain. What should Canada be doing in Afghanistan post-2011?

The government of Canada has skirted this issue in public with various opaque statements by the prime minister, the minister of Defence and other members of the Conservative cabinet. They have confirmed our withdrawal but have given hardly any indication as to what this will look like, whether a military presence will remain to carry out the development and training tasks they assert will continue or whether the U.S. will fill the void. Meanwhile Lt. General Andrew Leslie, the head of the Canadian army, has stated that they “currently do not have any plans, or even any line diagrams on a blank sheet of paper for post-2011.”

Motivated by the belief that decisions need to be taken long before 2011, that we can’t just up and pull out – that there are substantial strategic, ethical, and financial considerations – last week we convened a roundtable at the University of British Columbia in order to discuss these critical issues. We started with our own “blank sheet” and to fill it in, several seasoned Canadian experts who have lived and breathed Afghanistan over the last eight years, including Gordon Smith, Chris Alexander, and Graeme Smith. We posed a series of guiding questions that we hoped would incite debate. They were as follows:

1) Public support for the Afghan mission stands at 37 per cent in Canada and roughly half of Canadians are in support of a civilian mission post-2011. How are domestic politics likely to influence the shape of Canada's involvement? And what influence should they have?

2) The Canadian government has committed itself to a set of tasks for the benefit of the Afghan people. At the same time, the fighting has killed 131 Canadian soldiers and one diplomat. The war has cost between $11-12 billion. What responsibilities and obligations have we incurred? To the Afghan people? To NATO and the UN? To Canadians?

3) The Government has been unclear as to whether a contingent of Canadian forces will remain to protect delivery of assistance, or whether the ensuing void post-withdrawal will be covered by our U.S. and NATO allies. Moreover, does the withdrawal of a “mere” 2800 Canadians, compared with the U.S. 80,000, really mean a “gap”? What would assistance look like without military support? Can we “do” development without the military? What are the implications of a withdrawal for NATO and U.S. relations?

4) What are the options for our involvement? What are the costs and benefits of different options? What are the standards of evaluation? What is desirable? What is doable? How do we avoid what Gen. Hillier recently called “pie in the sky” ideas about Afghanistan? How do we avoid such ideas and ensure success in whatever it is that we commit ourselves to post-2011.

It is a tall order, we know, but we hope that this web forum, based on last week’s roundtable meeting, will be, at the very least, the start of a much needed discussion on these important issues.

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A Dose of Realism

A Dose of Realism

Description image by Mark Sedra Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation.
  • First Posted: Nov 12 2009 17:38 PM
  • Updated: 7 months

VIDEO: For real progress in Afghanistan, we will need to be pragmatic in our goals.

The debate over the future of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2011 must begin with the recognition of two fundamental points. First, despite the deteriorating security environment and rising political tensions, much has been accomplished over the past eight years. Canadian and international assistance has brought about improvements in almost every major development indicator, facilitated the return of millions of refugees and spurred a moribund economy. Second, rebuilding any failed state, particularly one as troubled as Afghanistan is a time and cost intensive process. Expectations must be recalibrated to reflect this inescapable reality. Afghanistan will not be a Switzerland of the Hindu Kush in this lifetime, and it may take decades for it to reach the level of a Nepal or Bangladesh. Even with these caveats, one cannot deny that the situation in Afghanistan today is grave and that the coming years may represent a turning point for the country. Accordingly, a vibrant debate on the future of Canada’s engagement in the country is needed and the following four issues should inform it:

  1. A clear strategy and vision must be in place to guide Afghanistan’s transition over the coming decade. The last major donor conference on Afghanistan was held in early 2006 in London, resulting in the signing of the Afghan Compact, an ambitious vision for Afghanistan’s reconstruction that seemingly failed to endow the international engagement with the clarity and purpose that was lacking. In this light, a new conference should be convened with the purpose of outlining firm and realistic benchmarks and goals for the years ahead and providing a foundation for a renewed partnership between the Afghan state and international community.
  2. Sustainable peace and stability will never be achieved in Afghanistan without a regional framework for cooperation. The time may be ripe for the formation of such a framework, with Pakistan gripped in its own struggle with Taliban militants and relations between Tehran and Washington showing signs of thawing. Such a framework could be overseen by the UN and include not only Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours but regional powers like India, Russia, and Saudi Arabia as well as the United States. Such an arrangement would not only address regional security threats, but break down barriers to trade. It could help transform Afghanistan’s “bad neighbourhood” from a driver of conflict to a key ingredient of stability and prosperity.
  3. The Afghan state must have the tools to provide for its own security. The present size of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is not sufficient for this task. The McChrystal report was right to suggest that force targets for the ANSF should be doubled from the current 200,000 to 400,000 within the coming years. This will require a massive increase in donor resources and a long-term commitment to subsidize the force, as the Afghan government will not have the capacity to sustain it for decades. However, when you consider that according to some estimates the cost of deploying one NATO soldier is equivalent to training five Afghan troops, such an approach is simply more cost effective.
  4. There is no military solution to the Afghan conflict. A domestic process of reconciliation is needed that will reach out both to receptive elements of the Taliban movement as well as disgruntled factional actors. This will involve not only talks with militant groups but dialogue with traditional leaders and authorities at the local level, actors who have oft felt alienated from political happenings in Kabul. While a number of initiatives have been launched to pursue this broad goal of reconciliation, a coherent Afghan-owned policy, with international backing is still lacking.

As Canada’s engagement is part of a multilateral enterprise, the nature of its continued involvement must entail a frank assessment of the willingness of others to stay the course. Moreover, it is important to remind Canadians that even in the absence of an active military role, Canada can play a crucial part in the future of Afghanistan, whether it is nurturing the nascent public administration, supporting development projects, or advancing security sector reform. Under the right conditions, as alluded to in this statement, success can be achieved in Afghanistan. However, it will take continued commitment and resolve as the time for half-measures and partial commitments has passed.

TAGS: Politics

Comments

Re:Marks

rules of engagement

The reality described in this article includes many mutually contradictory items. A coherent Afghan-owned policy devised by the international community (much less, devised by Washington and Kabul) is impossible. A coherent Afghan-owned policy cannot be be overseen by the listed "regional" powers. To be even remotely possible, regional should exclude those listed and concentrate on islamic republics immediately adjoining Afghanistan. A regional policy in which those republics take (at least partial) control of the neighbouring parts of Afghanistan dominated by their ethnic groups makes sense. All these solutions imagined by foreign powers will not create an Afghan-owned policy. The only thing the foreign powers can do that will help is leave. The country must just survive the help is has been given to date. It is not likely, but the chances get worse with each passing day of international help.

Brent Beach

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